The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu [Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1090 of 2026 dated May 18, 2026] granted bail to the appellant who had been incarcerated for over five years and nine months under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“the UAP Act”), the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“the NDPS Act”) read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), and authoritatively held that the statutory embargo under Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act cannot eclipse the fundamental right to speedy trial and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, reaffirming that the time-honoured principle “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 and the presumption of innocence, which cannot be displaced by legislation, and further clarifying that the three-Judge Bench ruling in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] is binding law entitled to the protection of stare decisis and cannot be diluted, circumvented, or disregarded by smaller Benches, High Courts or trial courts.
Facts:
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi (“the Appellant”), a government employee posted as a Village Level Worker in the Rural Development Department at Kupwara, Jammu & Kashmir, and a supporter of the Jammu & Kashmir People’s Conference, was placed under preventive detention on August 07, 2019 under the Jammu & Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 following the abrogation of Article 370. The preventive detention was subsequently revoked, and the order was eventually quashed by the High Court on June 26, 2020.
On June 11, 2020, FIR No. 183/2020 was registered at Handwara Police Station under Sections 8 and 21 of the NDPS Act after police intercepted a vehicle from which six packets of suspected narcotics and a large quantity of currency were seized. The Appellant was arrested on the same day. The Central Government thereafter directed the National Investigation Agency (“NIA”) to investigate, and the case was re-registered as RC-03/2020/NIA/JMU. The chargesheet was filed on December 05, 2020 invoking Sections 8, 21, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act read with Sections 17, 38 and 40 of the UAP Act read with Section 120B IPC. Charges were ultimately framed only on November 15, 2023.
Although the Appellant had been in custody for over five years and nine months, with more than three hundred and fifty prosecution witnesses still to be examined and the chances of an early conclusion of the trial being remote, the Special NIA Court rejected his regular bail application on August 10, 2024, which was upheld by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu on August 19, 2025. Notably, bail had already been granted by the same High Court to similarly placed co-accused persons (accused No. 3 Islam Ul Haq Peer, accused No. 12 Mudasir Ahmed Dar, and accused No. 13 Amin Allaie) and by the Supreme Court to co-accused Shri Romesh Kumar.
Issues:
- Whether the statutory embargo on the grant of bail under Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act and Section 37 of the NDPS Act can override the fundamental right to speedy trial and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in a case of prolonged pre-trial incarceration where the trial is unlikely to conclude in the foreseeable future; and
- Whether smaller Benches of the Supreme Court can progressively hollow out the constitutional force of a larger Bench decision (such as K.A. Najeeb) without expressly disagreeing with it or referring the matter to a larger Bench.
Held:
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1090 of 2026 held as under:
- Observed that, the often-invoked phrase “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is not merely an empty statutory slogan flowing from the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”), but is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and the presumption of innocence, which is the cornerstone of any civilised society governed by the rule of law, and the said principle applies even to offences under special enactments like the UAP Act and the NDPS Act, although bail can be denied in an appropriate case having regard to the facts of that particular case.
- Noted that, Article 21 of the Constitution is overarching and sacrosanct, and the right to a speedy trial is implicit therein; a constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an undertrial on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused under Article 21 has been infringed. The rigours of statutory provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act will “melt down” where there is no likelihood of the trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.
- Further noted that, the country-wide percentage of conviction under the UAP Act for the period 2019-2023 hovers between 2% to 6% (with the rate in Jammu and Kashmir being less than 1% annually), implying a 94% to 99% possibility of acquittal in such cases; therefore, continuing the detention of an undertrial in such circumstances, merely on the ground that the charges are serious, would be a travesty of the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.
- Held that, the decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], rendered by a three-Judge Bench, is binding law entitled to the protection of stare decisis and cannot be diluted, circumvented, or disregarded by trial courts, High Courts or even by Benches of lower strength of the Supreme Court itself; the subsequent two-Judge Bench decisions in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2024) 5 SCC 403] and Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [2026 SCC Online SC 10], to the extent they attempted to re-read K.A. Najeeb narrowly or formulate a “twin-prong test” foreclosing bail upon prima facie satisfaction under Section 43-D(5), do not represent the correct position of law.
- Further held that, even under the UAP Act, “bail is the rule and jail is the exception”; the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain a circumscribed restriction operating subject to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, and constitutional courts retain the authority to intervene and grant bail notwithstanding satisfaction of the prima facie threshold under Section 43-D(5), particularly where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial would breach Article 21.
- Directed that, the Appellant be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the Special NIA Court may deem fit and proper, and additionally, the Appellant shall deposit his passport before the Special NIA Court and appear before the Handwara Police Station once every fortnight; he shall continue to cooperate with the ongoing trial and shall not threaten or try to influence any of the witnesses.
Accordingly, the criminal appeal was allowed, and the Appellant was granted bail.
OUR COMMENTS & ANALYSIS:
The decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi is a landmark reaffirmation of the constitutional supremacy of Article 21 over statutory embargoes on bail. The Hon’ble Court has unequivocally restored the doctrinal primacy of K.A. Najeeb and demolished the attempt by smaller Benches in Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima to read down the binding ratio under the guise of contextual distinctions. The judgment carries profound implications not merely for terror-related prosecutions, but for the entire landscape of pre-trial detention under special criminal statutes — including the GST regime under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (“the CGST Act”), the Customs Act, 1962, the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), and the NDPS Act.
[A] Relevant Provisions Invoked in the Case
Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act begins with a non-obstante clause and provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C., no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the UAP Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard. The proviso adds a further fetter — bail shall not be granted if the Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. Sub-section (6) clarifies that these restrictions are in addition to all other limitations on bail under the Cr.P.C. or any other law.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act similarly declares offences cognizable and non-bailable, and prescribes the “twin conditions” for bail in cases involving commercial quantity or offences under Sections 19, 24 or 27A — namely that (i) the Public Prosecutor must be heard, and (ii) the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
The Hon’ble Court has now firmly clarified that these statutory restrictions cannot operate to indefinitely deprive an accused of his Article 21 right to liberty and a speedy trial. As laid down in K.A. Najeeb and reaffirmed in the present judgment, the moment prolonged incarceration coupled with the unlikelihood of trial within a reasonable time is established, the rigour of the statutory embargo melts down and constitutional courts are obligated to enlarge the accused on bail.
[B] Pari Materia Judgments Reinforcing the Constitutional Primacy of Article 21
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713]: The three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court categorically held that the statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act do not per se oust the ability of constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Both statutory and constitutional powers can be harmonised. The rigours of such provisions will “melt down” where there is no likelihood of trial within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.
Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P. [(2024) 8 SCC 293]: Reiterated that NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] must be read in its specific factual context and cannot be invoked to deny bail to an undertrial suffering long incarceration.
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [(2024) 9 SCC 813]: The Hon’ble Court declared that Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime, and the right to speedy trial cannot be eclipsed by the gravity of the offence. Prolonged incarceration without trial converts pre-trial detention into punishment.
Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India [(2024) 10 SCC 574]: Reaffirmed that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” is settled law, and denial of bail in deserving cases would violate Article 21.
Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI [(2022) 10 SCC 51]: Held that the general principle in Section 436A Cr.P.C. — that an accused be enlarged on bail if the trial is not concluded within the specified period — applies even to special enactments like the NDPS Act.
Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India [(1996) 2 SCC 616]: Recognised the tension between individual liberty and societal interest in combating terrorism, and emphasised that innocent undertrials cannot be made to languish in jail for years awaiting trial.
Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement [2026 SCC OnLine SC 30]: Applied the Najeeb principle to grant bail under the PMLA, holding that the right to speedy trial is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
[C] Contrary / Distinguished Judgments
Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2024) 5 SCC 403]: A two-Judge Bench had attempted to formulate a “twin-prong test” for bail under Section 43-D(5) and held that the legislative intent under the UAP Act was that “bail must be rejected as a rule”. The Hon’ble Court in the present judgment has unequivocally disagreed with this reading, holding that a smaller Bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or disregard the ratio of a larger Bench.
Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [2026 SCC Online SC 10]: Another two-Judge Bench attempted to narrowly read Najeeb by holding that prolonged custody is not by itself a ground for bail under special statutes. The present judgment has expressed “serious reservations” on this approach, observing that Gulfisha Fatima “hollows out” the constitutional force of Najeeb.
NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1]: Often cited as a stringent precedent under Section 43-D(5), the Hon’ble Court has now confined Watali to its specific facts (where the High Court had improperly conducted a mini-trial at the bail stage) and held that it cannot be used as a general rule of near-automatic denial of bail under the UAP Act.
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS: THE BAIL AND JAIL JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE GST REGIME
The constitutional principles articulated in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi and the unbroken line of authority anchored in K.A. Najeeb travel well beyond UAP Act cases. They squarely govern the bail jurisprudence under Section 132 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, where prosecution for tax-evasion offences has frequently resulted in prolonged pre-trial incarceration on largely documentary evidence. A careful analysis of the GST bail framework — read in light of the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception — is essential for every tax practitioner.
[i] Statutory Framework — Section 132, 69, 70, 134, 135, 137, 138 of the CGST Act
Section 132 of the CGST Act enumerates the offences for which a taxable person may be criminally prosecuted, including: (a) supply of goods/services without the issuance of any invoice with intent to evade tax; (b) issuance of any invoice or bill without supply of goods/services in violation of the Act (commonly called “fake invoicing”); (c) availment of input tax credit (“ITC”) using fake invoices; (d) collection of any amount as tax but failure to pay the same to the Government beyond three months; (e) evasion of tax, fraudulent availment of ITC, or fraudulent refund where the amount involved exceeds the prescribed thresholds; (f) falsification of financial records or production of fake accounts; (g) obstruction of officers; (h) acquisition or dealing in goods liable to confiscation; (i) receipt of services in contravention of the Act; (j) tampering with material evidence; and (k) attempting to commit or abetting the commission of any of the above.
The classification of offences as cognizable / bailable hinges on the quantum of tax evaded or ITC fraudulently availed:
- Tax / ITC ≥ INR 5 crore — punishment up to 5 years and fine; the offence is cognizable and non-bailable [Section 132(5) read with Section 132(1)(i)].
- Tax / ITC between INR 2 crore and INR 5 crore — punishment up to 3 years and fine; non-cognizable and bailable [Section 132(4) read with Section 132(1)(ii)].
- Tax / ITC between INR 1 crore and INR 2 crore — punishment up to 1 year and fine; non-cognizable and bailable [Section 132(4) read with Section 132(1)(iii)].
- Offences under clauses (f), (g) and (j) — punishment up to 6 months or fine; non-cognizable and bailable [Section 132(4) read with Section 132(1)(iv)].
Section 69 of the CGST Act empowers the Commissioner, where he has “reasons to believe” that a person has committed any of the offences specified in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 132(1) punishable under Section 132(1)(i) or (ii) or Section 132(2), to authorise any officer to arrest such person. Section 70 grants the power to summon for examination.
Section 134 of the CGST Act mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under Section 132 except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner; Section 135 raises a presumption of culpable mental state (which is rebuttable); Section 137 provides for vicarious liability of directors and officers of companies; and Section 138 provides for compounding of offences on payment of compounding amount (now uniformly fixed at 25%-100% of the tax involved under the amended scheme), subject to certain exclusions.
[ii] Landmark Supreme Court Pronouncements on Bail in GST Offences
Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India [2025 INSC 272; Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 336 of 2018 dated February 27, 2025]: A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (CJI Sanjiv Khanna, Justices M.M. Sundresh and Bela M. Trivedi) delivered a landmark judgment upholding the constitutional validity of the arrest powers under Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act and the corresponding provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, while subjecting them to robust constitutional safeguards. The Hon’ble Court ruled that:
- The provisions of the Cr.P.C. (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) are “equally applicable” to arrests under the CGST Act and the Customs Act, including the principles laid down in K. Basu v. State of West Bengal [(1997) 1 SCC 416] and Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [(2014) 8 SCC 273].
- Arrest cannot be made on “mere suspicion” and must be backed by credible material recorded as “reasons to believe”; the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrestee in writing, in accordance with the law laid down in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [(2024) 7 SCC 576] and Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement [(2025) 2 SCC 248].
- Arrests should not be made in cases of a technical nature or where the demand is based on differences of interpretation of law; “adjudication must precede arrest” in such instances.
- Anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. (now Section 482 BNSS) is maintainable in GST and Customs matters even at the pre-FIR / pre-summons stage; the earlier two-Judge Bench rulings in State of Gujarat v. Choodamani Parmeshwaran Iyer [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1043] and Bharat Bhushan v. Director General of GST Intelligence [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2586] stand overruled to that extent.
- Coercive recovery of tax under threat of arrest, before adjudication, is impermissible; voluntary payments are permissible but cannot be extracted under coercion.
Vineet Jain v. Union of India [Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 4349 of 2025 dated April 28, 2025; (2025) 30 Centax 57 (S.C.); 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 513]: A Division Bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan (the same Justice Bhuyan who authored the present Syed Iftikhar Andrabi judgment) granted bail to a person accused under Clauses (c), (f) and (h) of Section 132(1) of the CGST Act. The accused had been in custody for nearly seven months when the chargesheet was already filed, the maximum sentence prescribed was only 5 years, the trial was triable by a Judicial Magistrate and the entire prosecution was based on documentary evidence with no antecedents. The Hon’ble Court expressed surprise at bail having been refused at all levels including the High Court and authoritatively held that:
“These are the cases where in normal course, before the Trial Courts, the accused should get bail unless there are some extraordinary circumstances.”
Ratnambar Kaushik v. Union of India [SLP (Criminal) No. 10319 of 2022 dated December 05, 2022]: The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted bail to an accused under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act who had undergone about four months of custody, holding that as the available evidence was mainly documentary and electronic in nature, the possibility of tampering, intimidation or influencing witnesses was minimal.
Ashutosh Garg v. Union of India [SLP (Criminal) No. 8740 of 2024 dated July 26, 2024]: The Hon’ble Supreme Court granted bail to an accused even where the alleged fraudulent ITC availment exceeded INR 1,032 crore through 294 fake firms, citing the custody period of about 9 months and the fact that the maximum imprisonment under Section 132 of the CGST Act is only 5 years.
Yashik Jindal v. Union of India [2023 SCC OnLine SC 417 dated March 28, 2023]: The Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside a condition imposed by the High Court of Rajasthan requiring a deposit of INR 2 crore as a pre-condition for grant of bail under Section 132 of the CGST Act, deprecating such onerous conditions and relying on Subhash Chouhan v. Union of India [2023 SCC OnLine SC 110].
Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [(2012) 1 SCC 40]: Though arising in a 2G Spectrum case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the foundational rule that economic offences, though serious, cannot justify indefinite custody and that the gravity of the alleged offence and the punishment prescribed cannot be the sole criterion for refusing bail. This principle is routinely applied in GST bail jurisprudence.
P.V. Ramana Reddy v. Union of India [2019 SCC OnLine TS 2516, SLP dismissed by the Supreme Court on May 27, 2019]: Initially upheld pre-arrest action by GST authorities; however, the impact of this ruling has been considerably diluted post Radhika Agarwal which has clarified the availability of anticipatory bail and procedural safeguards.
Siddharth v. State of U.P. [(2022) 1 SCC 676]: Held that arrest is not mandatory upon filing of a chargesheet; the CBIC has issued Instruction No. 02/2022-23 dated August 17, 2022 incorporating these principles into the GST arrest framework, mandating that arrest should be the exception, not the rule.
[iii] Recent High Court Decisions Applying the Liberal Bail Approach in GST Cases
Gaurav Babu Jain v. State of Haryana [CRM-M-48645-2025 dated November 03, 2025; 2025 (11) TMI 825 (P&H HC)]: The Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court granted bail to a petitioner arrested under Section 132(1) of the CGST Act, who was alleged to be the mastermind behind a network of 11 bogus firms generating fake invoices to pass fraudulent ITC. The Court applied the Vineet Jain, Ashutosh Garg and Ratnambar Kaushik line of authority and reiterated that prolonged custody is unjustified where evidence is predominantly documentary or electronic.
Manoj Gupta v. Union of India [CRM-M No. 20320 of 2025 dated July 14, 2025 (P&H HC)]: Released the accused on bail after 6 months and 24 days of custody for alleged ITC fraud, observing that apprehension of tampering must be balanced against the available non-custodial safeguards where evidence is documentary.
Akshay Goyal v. Union of India [2023:AHC:216283 (Allahabad HC)]: Granted bail observing that the accused had been arrested without recorded “reasons to believe”, that the offence was punishable only up to 5 years, and that no notice for recovery of GST had been issued — echoing the principle that economic offences cannot justify indefinite custody when the accused is not a habitual offender.
Make My Trip (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [2016 SCC OnLine Del 4951 (Delhi HC)]: Though decided under the Service Tax / Finance Act regime, the Delhi High Court laid down the principle that arrest cannot precede an assessment determining the tax liability — a principle which has, to a limited extent, been diluted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhika Agarwal which permits arrest based on “sufficient material” even without a formal assessment, but only where strict procedural safeguards are observed.
[iv] Comparative Analysis: UAP Act vs CGST Act — The Common Thread of Article 21
Although the UAP Act deals with offences against the sovereignty and integrity of the nation, and the CGST Act deals with revenue offences, both regimes share an important common feature: the Legislature has carved out a special framework that ostensibly tilts the balance against the accused. Under the UAP Act, Section 43-D(5) imposes a non-obstante embargo and a prima facie threshold; under the CGST Act, Section 132(5) classifies serious offences as cognizable and non-bailable. In both cases, the question that arises is whether the special statutory regime can override the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
The judicial response — from K.A. Najeeb through Sheikh Javed Iqbal, Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh, Arvind Dham, Radhika Agarwal, Vineet Jain, and now Syed Iftikhar Andrabi — is unequivocal: Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of the offence. The statutory embargo melts down where (a) the trial is unlikely to conclude in a reasonable time, (b) the accused has undergone a substantial part of the prescribed sentence, or (c) the evidence is largely documentary, and the risk of tampering is minimal. “The more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication ought to be” — a maxim equally applicable to terror-funding allegations and to allegations of fraudulent ITC availment.
This convergence has profound practical implications for the assessment and offences-and-penalties framework under the GST law. Where the GST Department issues a show cause notice (“SCN”) under Section 74 of the CGST Act alleging fraudulent availment of ITC, the criminal complaint under Section 132 would typically follow only after sanction under Section 134. In the interregnum, where the accused is arrested under Section 69, the Departmental adjudication often takes months or years to be concluded by the Adjudicating Authority, then assailed before the First Appellate Authority under Section 107, and ultimately before the GST Appellate Tribunal under Section 112. Pending such protracted adjudication, the accused cannot be made to languish in jail — a position now firmly anchored in Vineet Jain, Radhika Agarwal, and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi.
[v] Key Takeaways for GST Practitioners and Taxpayers
[I] Anticipatory bail is maintainable in GST and Customs matters at the pre-arrest stage, following the overruling of Choodamani Iyer and Bharat Bhushan by Radhika Agarwal.
[II] Arrest under Section 69 of the CGST Act is not the norm — it must be preceded by recorded “reasons to believe” based on credible material; mere suspicion or technical disputes over interpretation cannot justify arrest. The arrestee is entitled to written grounds of arrest, access to counsel during interrogation (with reasonable limits), and compliance with the D.K. Basu safeguards.
[III] Where the evidence is primarily documentary or electronic (as is typical in fake invoicing and ITC fraud cases), the risk of tampering is presumed to be low; this is a powerful factor weighing in favour of bail.
[IV] Pre-trial custody exceeding even six to seven months in a Section 132 case, especially where the offence is triable by a Magistrate and the maximum sentence is only five years, is now treated as a strong ground for bail — see Vineet Jain (7 months), Ratnambar Kaushik (4 months), and Ashutosh Garg (9 months).
[V] Onerous bail conditions, such as deposit of tax demands as a condition of bail, are impermissible (per Yashik Jindal and Subhash Chouhan).
[VI] Coercive recovery of tax under threat of arrest is impermissible — voluntary payments under Section 73(5) / 74(5) of the CGST Act are permissible, but cannot be the product of coercion (per Radhika Agarwal).
[VII] The principles in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi — that the statutory embargo melts down in the face of prolonged custody and an unlikely trial — apply with full force to Section 132 GST prosecutions, particularly because the maximum sentence under Section 132 (five years) is substantially less than under the UAP Act or the NDPS Act, making the case for bail in GST matters proportionately stronger.
Conclusion: The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi is a constitutional reaffirmation that the right to personal liberty and a speedy trial under Article 21 is over-arching and sacrosanct, transcending the strictest statutory embargo. For the GST community, this decision — coupled with the recent and growing line of authority comprising Radhika Agarwal, Vineet Jain, Ashutosh Garg, Ratnambar Kaushik, and Gaurav Babu Jain — provides a robust constitutional shield against the arbitrary deployment of arrest and detention powers under Section 69 read with Section 132 of the CGST Act. Tax practitioners must take note: the days when a GST evasion allegation, however grave, could result in indefinite pre-trial incarceration are well and truly behind us. Bail, even in the GST regime, is now once again the rule — and jail, the exception.
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